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THE MEXICAN EXPEDITION OF 1862-1867 AND THE END OF THE FRENCH SECOND EMPIRE* 
JEROME GREENFIELD 
King’s College London 
 
The End of the French Second Empire 
 
ABSTRACT. The French expedition to Mexico from 1862 to 1867 rarely features in accounts 
of the origins of the Franco-Prussian War or of the liberalization of the French Second 
Empire in its final years. By contrast, this article uses a range of archival and published 
sources to argue that the failure of the Mexican expedition was an important factor in the 
crisis that convulsed French politics in the late 1860s. The legitimacy of the fiscal-military 
system was undermined, in large part because of the burdens that the expedition imposed 
on the French people. There resulted difficulties over finance and the army, which hindered 
the Second Empire’s ability to confront the Prussian threat and accelerated the emergence 
of the ‘Liberal Empire’ with the constitutional reforms of 1867-1870. Liberalization, though, 
could not rescue the imperial regime, and the legitimacy crisis of the Second Empire was 
only resolved by a transition to a parliamentary democracy under the Third Republic. 
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The French intervention in Mexico from 1862 to 1867 has spawned a large literature, but 
curiously little of it considers the expedition’s consequences for France or Europe. Though 
historians have situated the wars of German unification in a global context,1 the Mexican 
expedition barely features in standard accounts of the origins of the Franco-Prussian War.2 
Moreover, while historians have long noted the unpopularity of the Mexican expedition,3 
they have generally underplayed its importance in explaining the political and constitutional 
reform of the French Second Empire in the late 1860s.4 Instead of considering the 
ramifications for French domestic politics, historians of the expedition have been principally 
concerned to explain how the French came to expend so much blood and treasure in a 
region in which they had prima facie so few strategic or economic interests. Thus, much of 
the scholarship addresses questions of diplomatic, intellectual and cultural history, 
reconstructing Franco-Mexican relations from the 1820s onwards, explaining Napoleon III’s 
objectives in Mexico and analysing the regime that the French created there.5 While some 
of this work discusses the expedition’s consequences for France – particularly regarding its 
relationship with contemporaneous French imperialism in Algeria, Indochina and elsewhere 
– the impact in Europe has been comparatively neglected.6 Indeed, the conquest of Algeria 
aside, historians have largely overlooked the effects of French extra-European policy on 
France, reflecting a broader disregard for French imperial history from 1814 to 1870.7 
 As we shall see, however, the Mexican expedition had a severe impact on French 
politics, stimulating the liberalization of the Second Empire in the 1860s and reducing the 
regime’s capacity to cope with a deteriorating international situation in Europe. These 
consequences are apparent in the finances of the Mexican expedition, which have received 
relatively little attention despite historians’ focus on explaining why the French expended 
such resources in Mexico in the first place. While scholars have given some attention to the 
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economic motivations for the Mexican expedition and its financial history,8 they have largely 
overlooked the question of how the costs of the intervention affected the French public – a 
crucial issue, since the latter’s willingness to bear the burdens of the fiscal-military system, 
that is the taxes and conscription which underwrote French great power, directly affected 
France’s ability to face the Prussian threat. As Edward Shawcross has observed, the limited 
popularity of the Mexican expedition pushed the French government to seek to minimize 
the costs by installing the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Austrian Emperor Franz 
Josef, as emperor of Mexico in 1864. Upon accepting the throne, Maximilian agreed the 
Miramar Convention with France, stipulating that his government would reimburse the 
French 270 million francs for the costs of the expedition hitherto and would finance the 
presence of French troops in Mexico thereafter. Shawcross argues that the use of 
Maximilian’s regime as a vehicle for informal empire contributed to the expedition’s failure; 
had the French sought to occupy Mexico the way they had Algeria after 1830, he suggests, 
the intervention’s chances of success might have increased. However, the enormous 
expense of conquering Algeria made it unattractive as a model for French imperialism 
elsewhere.9 Indeed, the costs of the expedition were the reason that the French gave 
Maximilian’s government for their withdrawal.10 Moreover, even if the French had been 
willing to bear the costs of direct rule in Mexico, they would still have had to contend with 
the hostility of the United States. Not only did the Americans, particularly after the end of 
their Civil War in 1865, contribute materially to the republican guerrilla war against 
Maximilian’s Empire, but pressure from Washington pushed the French to accelerate their 
withdrawal in 1867.11  
 Though aggravated by republican guerrillas and the French desire to intervene in 
Mexico on the cheap, the financial problem was incipient from the outset. While the 
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expedition was partly motivated by the desire to nurture the strength of the ‘Latin’ race and 
so check the power of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ United States, secure better access to Mexican 
resources such as silver and cotton and extend French commerce, the pretext for the 
expedition in 1862 was Mexico’s default on foreign debt. Mexico, thus, faced severe fiscal 
difficulties before the French arrived. In the final years of Spanish rule, the colony slipped 
into deficit as Madrid sought to offload mounting budgetary problems at home onto the 
colonies, initiating a period of fiscal instability that lasted into independence.12 Protracted 
political volatility thereafter, not least disagreements over federalism and centralization, 
hindered the construction of a stable and effective fiscal system.13 Most recently, a civil war 
of 1857-1860 – the Reform War – that followed the promulgation of a liberal constitution in 
1857 had interrupted tax collection, stimulating banditry and resistance to taxation. The 
French intervention did little to alleviate Mexico’s socio-economic problems. On the 
contrary, banditry and unrest increased, encouraged by opponents of the French 
intervention who fought a guerrilla war, aggravating problems of taxation and adding to the 
costs of the expedition by increasing France’s military difficulties. Benito Juárez, the 
Mexican president before the intervention, did everything he could to make life as hard as 
possible for the French, maintaining a diverse coalition of radicals, moderates and liberals 
while cultivating support in Washington. 
 Concerns about the expense of the Mexican expedition reflected the French public’s 
general wariness of Napoleon’s aggressive foreign policy, which entailed military 
interventions in the Crimea, Italy, Syria, China and Indochina in addition to Mexico – all of 
which cost money and men.14 Throughout the Second Empire, the government’s seeming 
willingness to spend money provoked criticism of fiscal irresponsibility.15 To appease the 
critics, Napoleon appointed Achille Fould as finance minister in 1861 to pursue fiscal 
 5 
equilibrium. Given the series of military actions abroad, Fould raised taxes. Naturally, the 
ensuing fiscal burden was unpopular. Despite increasing taxes, though, Fould ultimately 
aimed to reduce them and streamline the state, thus enhancing the legitimacy of the fiscal 
system. Indeed, the desire to cut taxes was one reason for the conclusion of the Franco-
British commercial treaty in 1860. While the 1850s had been boom years, the 1860s were 
more turbulent economically, given the disruption arising from poor harvests, cholera, wars 
and financial crises. Spending on public works such as railways, slashed after 1848 to 
accommodate pressure for retrenchment, rose alongside military expenditure as the 
government sought to counteract economic malaise. While public works had been largely 
delegated to the private sector in the 1850s, investor confidence was more volatile in the 
1860s, necessitating greater government action.16 The expense both of the latter and of an 
aggressive foreign policy impeded the tax cuts that might have bolstered the legitimacy of 
the regime. 
 Napoleon’s foreign policy had further domestic political costs. His sponsoring Italian 
unification, and thus the absorption of the Papal State into Italy in 1860, eroded Catholic 
support for the Empire, while the regime also lost support in industrial areas that suffered 
from the lowering of tariffs that followed the Franco-British commercial treaty of 1860. Still, 
the government’s position was sufficiently solid that the initial moves towards political 
liberalization, intended to recalibrate support for the Empire, in November 1860 were not 
forced on Napoleon but rather reflected his choice.17 Likewise, the regime proved willing to 
countenance greater decentralization in the 1860s, stimulating greater vibrancy in local 
politics and ultimately the emergence of the ‘republican’ notion of citizenship that 
characterized the Third Republic.18 However, with opposition progress in the elections of 
1863 and 1869 and growing popular discontent in the late 1860s, the government was 
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pushed to further concessions, hastening the liberalization of the Empire. As we shall see, 
the legacy of the Mexican debacle contributed to these problems, weakening the regime 
and reducing France’s chance of victory over Prussia in 1870. 
 
 
I 
 
Soon after the French arrived in Mexico, it became clear that expedition would not be quick, 
easy or cheap. ‘I do not know how we will get out,’ Fould wrote in September 1862, ‘and 
what advantage we can get from it [the expedition]. The news which reaches me from 
Mexico makes me tremble for the finances.’19 Considering Mexico as a potentially wealthy 
country, the French did not anticipate the expense of the expedition. Instead, Napoleon 
expected it, and the settlement of Mexican finances, to be quick and easy: ‘one of the first 
questions will be the re-establishment of order in the finances, because that will permit us, 
without overburdening the country, to pay ourselves our indemnities.’ To his knowledge, 
the Mexican government’s ordinary revenues would suffice for this purpose.20 In other 
words, the French were drawn into Mexico partly by casual racial and cultural assumptions 
that they could tap the country’s wealth more effectively than the Mexicans themselves. 
Such assumptions of superiority probably contributed to the French reluctance to leave 
Mexico once these rosy expectations were disappointed. The notion of Mexican inferiority 
both increased the reluctance to concede defeat and made victory appear more achievable.  
 The French faced numerous difficulties when they landed, most of which had 
financial ramifications. Shortly after arriving in Veracruz, the French commander Charles de 
Lorencez noted the ‘excessive price of everything in Mexico’;21 the French, wrote a finance 
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ministry official the following year, had to make their purchases in piastres ‘at an excessive 
rate’.22 While Mexico had land of ‘extraordinary fertility’ alongside extensive mineral 
wealth, the French could not just exploit this at will. Indeed, despite Mexico’s reputed 
wealth in gold and silver, the French faced shortages of specie, and thus prohibited its 
export while having to import it to allow the army to purchase supplies.23 Such difficulties, 
arising from social turbulence and the limited capacity of the Mexican state, were 
exacerbated by Juárez’s partisans but may have nevertheless increased the French sense of 
superiority over the Mexicans. As Lorencez wrote, ‘We have such a superiority over the 
Mexicans of race, of organization, of discipline, of morality and of elevation of sentiments 
that I pray your Excellency to please inform the Emperor that from now, at the head of 
these 6,000 soldiers, I am the master of Mexico.’24 Despite his defeat at Puebla by a smaller 
force a few days later, which retarded the French advance and boosted the morale of 
Juárez’s forces, the French generally continued to consider the Mexicans inferior. Indeed, 
considering his Mexican auxiliaries, Lorencez wrote that they ‘avail us almost nothing, 
ravage the country and increase our unpopularity.’25 Given the perceived inadequacies of 
France’s Mexican allies – which had some justification – and the defeat at Puebla, the 
French sent reinforcements under the command of General Forey, adding to the cost of the 
expedition. Already, Lorencez had logistical difficulties with his 6,000 men; the proposed 
increase to 25,000 would obviously exacerbate these problems. Ultimately, the French army 
in Mexico grew to 30,000 men.  
 The reinforcement of the army after Puebla reflected the new reality of the Mexican 
expedition. Rather than the relatively rapid operation the French may have had in mind at 
the outset, they had to reconcile themselves with the possibility of a protracted 
intervention. In June 1862, Lorencez wrote that ‘After several years of Monarchy this 
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country would obtain an amazing degree of prosperity. But nobody here wants monarchy, 
not even the reactionaries. The Mexicans are all infatuated with liberal ideas’.26 A month 
later, he reiterated that he ‘had not seen a single partisan of monarchy in Mexico’, but 
hoped that a French occupation of ‘several years’ would rectify this deficiency.27 As his 
remarks about Mexico’s potential prosperity indicated, the intervention would have to be 
accompanied by a process of state-formation, which would serve as an instrument for 
informal empire in Mexico and allow the French to extract the means required to reimburse 
themselves the cost of the expedition. Thus, in November 1862, Fould sent a former 
receiver general, Budin, ‘to constitute in Mexico, as soon as possible, a good financial 
administration.’28 In 1863, he was reinforced by 12 agents drawn from the different 
branches of the finance ministry to assist him in imposing order and regularity on Mexico’s 
finances.29 Simultaneously with Budin’s appointment, Fould opened negotiations with 
bankers to reduce the costs of procuring credit in Mexico to cover the army’s needs.30 
 While Budin’s mission extended to raising money from any taxes available, the 
French directed most of their attention towards customs. In part, they did so because 
customs revenues were hypothecated to cover the payments Mexico owed the French, 
British and Spanish. Other taxes were problematic, given the difficulties the French had in 
imposing authority across Mexico, particularly on rural areas. While Maximilian’s regime 
raised direct taxes, these seem to have yielded little; in 1866, General Bazaine, who 
replaced Forey as commander of the expedition in 1863, noted that landed estates did not 
produce enough to pay the taxes imposed on them.31 Controlling major ports, customs were 
a relatively easy tax for the French exploit, even if the violence that accompanied their 
expedition impeded the commerce that underlay customs revenues. Consequently, customs 
were the main source of tax revenue during the intervention.  
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 While the French installed agents to oversee the collection of customs duties, 
revenue remained inadequate.32 Throughout the intervention, customs provoked 
complaints from taxpayers for the uneven collection of the duties and their seeming 
arbitrariness.33 Pending the creation of a more productive tax system, Forey decided to emit 
for the new Mexican government treasury bills of up to 200,000 piastres per month, 
guaranteed by France.34 While the Miramar Convention specified that the Mexican army 
would cease to be financed by the French on 1 July 1864, this proved impossible to 
implement, given the Mexican government’s lack of means. Thus, Bazaine stipulated that 
the costs of the Mexican army would continue to be paid by the French, who were 
ultimately to be reimbursed.35 ‘The financial situation will improve, I hope,’ he wrote shortly 
afterwards, ‘but it progresses slowly up to now. It is necessary, above all, to create an 
administration and to find some politicians. It is necessary to create resources and there 
exist no others besides the old taxes which are totally insufficient and barely established.’36  
 The problems with taxation weakened Mexican government credit, which 
simultaneously assumed greater importance as a source of revenue. Indeed, as he 
contemplated accepting the Mexican crown, Maximilian sought to ensure a loan for his 
prospective government.37 Upon taking the throne, he opened negotiations in Paris and 
London, creating the Commission des finances du Mexique in Paris under the Count de 
Germiny, a former French finance minister and ex-governor of the Banque de France. French 
financiers, though, inclined to follow the lead of the City, which had hitherto provided most 
of Mexico’s foreign credit. If the bondholders who had suffered from the default of 1861 
were not compensated, wrote the Paris banker Salomon de Rothschild, the British market 
would be closed to the loan, rendering it unfeasible.38 In any case, Maximilian hoped to 
minimise his dependence on the French. Thus, he concluded a contract with the London 
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firm of Glyn Mills for 305 million francs. The loan, however, was poorly received by 
investors,39 leaving the French with a considerable problem: if Mexico could not procure 
funds on the market, the French government would have to provide more money. Fould, 
wrote the Paris banker Hottinguer, regarded the loan ‘as a resource for his treasury’.40 Of 
the nominal 534 million francs that Mexico borrowed in two loans in 1864 and 1865, only 34 
million went to Maximilian’s government.41 The rest went to service existing foreign debts 
and to the French treasury. While the costs of the expedition were still large enough to keep 
Fould’s 1864 budget in deficit,42 the sums spent on Mexico were relatively small (table 1). 
Excluding 31,713,000 francs that the navy ministry spent on foreign interventions without 
being able to disaggregate the costs for each mission, the Mexican expedition cost 
approximately 363,165,000 francs from 1861 to 1867 and produced revenues of around 
61,975,000, comprising reimbursements from the Mexican government, the sale of Mexican 
bonds and income from Mexican customs.43 Even without these revenues, Mexico never 
cost more than 5% of the French government’s budget in any given year from 1861 to 1867. 
Though the expense of informal empire in Mexico was easily sustainable, it was still 
significant enough to impede tax cuts and thus impress public opinion with the costs of the 
expedition, as we shall see. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 Given their desire to minimize expenditure in Mexico, the French acted to rescue the 
1864 loan. Already in 1862, Fould had expressed his willingness to assist the Mexican 
government in obtaining credit.44 While the British had been Mexico’s principal overseas 
creditors before 1861, the tripling of Mexico’s foreign debt during the intervention was 
largely financed by the French.45 Faced with lacklustre results in London, the Commission 
des finances du Mexique replaced the conventional 6% bonds issued by Glyn Mills with 
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lottery bonds.46 The use of the latter reflected a shift in the market for Mexican securities. 
Whereas Glyn Mills had moved to issue the loan in the usual fashion, relying on bankers and 
their lists of subscribers, lottery bonds were designed with a more demotic appeal: their 
offer, in this instance, of a biannual cash prize targeted French small investors instead of 
high financiers. ‘Prizes, premiums and all sorts of combinations of games’, wrote the Paris 
banker Alphonse de Rothschild, would ensure that the loan ‘would be taken would be taken 
by the country itself, which greatly likes games and lotteries.’47 Another loan of 250 million 
francs in 1865 was issued by the same means, and Fould expressed his ‘delight’ that 70,000 
people had invested.48 Government officials publicly endorsed the loans, projecting an 
economic bonanza in Mexico and helping to raise the number of investors in Mexican 
bonds, ultimately, to 300,000.49 Though the loans were raised successfully, they came with 
significant risk premiums: 14.43% interest in 1864 and 15.6-16.49% in 1865. While elite 
bankers still took a significant portion of these loans,50 which they then sold, the recourse to 
French small investors presented a severe political difficulty when it came to withdrawing 
from Mexico a few months later. Fould’s ‘delight’ was thus short-lived. 
 Besides rescuing the Mexican loan, Fould also sought to ease Mexican government 
credit and stimulate the Mexican economy through the creation of a Banco de México, 
modelled on the Banque de France. Whereas substantial parts of the loans could be raised 
from relatively low-information small investors, the bank would rely on high financiers, 
some of whom had agents or contacts in Mexico. Already in 1863, Fould was discussing 
proposals to this end with several bankers. Pitching the idea to Hottinguer, who then 
enlisted other bankers in support, Fould suggested that the state-formation – chiefly the 
creation of a functioning fiscal system and army – on which the French had embarked in 
Mexico would prevent their withdrawal for at least 3 years. Thus, Hottinguer, despite his 
 12 
unwillingness to partake in issuing Mexican bonds,51 concluded that ‘in these conditions it 
seems to me that this proposal of a bank can be usefully pursued’;52 ‘if France maintains its 
administration in that country [Mexico], the privilege that we obtain can only be an 
excellent affair’.53 Hottinguer had few illusions about the situation in Mexico. It was a 
‘shattered country’, whose ‘credit is to be completely reconstructed’.54 While Maximilian 
stalled approving the bank’s statutes, perhaps hoping for a counteroffer, these and an 
advance of 10 million francs were finally agreed in February 1865 with distinguished 
members of the Paris haute banque, including Hottinguer, Pillet Will, Mallet, Fould, Seillière 
and Marcuard André alongside the City firm Finlay Hodgson.55 Hottinguer’s colleagues, 
though, were generally warier of the proposal than he was. Considering it an ‘extravagant 
idea’, Marcuard, for example, only acquiesced because ‘I do not want to separate myself 
from our friends... who probably have good reasons’ for endorsing the proposal.56 Baring, 
Hottinguer’s principal correspondent in London, declined to participate, on the basis that 
the bank could risk the firm’s reputation – though he was confident that ‘you will make 
money by your shares... in the Paris hotbed of speculation’.57 Such lukewarm sentiments 
contributed to the collapse of the syndicate in September, due to concerns about the 
mismanagement of Mexican finances. While the Comptoir d’escompte de Paris took over 
the contract, the project ultimately failed.58 
 The abandonment of the Banco de México perhaps reflected a decline in French 
support for Maximilian’s regime. Seeking to establish a basis for his rule that did not rest 
exclusively on the French army, the emperor sought to conciliate different factions in 
Mexican politics under an enlightened, moderate liberalism; at the same time, he used 
ceremony and urban renovations in Mexico City to try to impress his new subjects with the 
mystique of monarchy – at considerable expense.59 The French were generally 
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underwhelmed by these efforts. Within a few months of Maximilian’s arrival, Bazaine was 
complaining that the ‘torpor which paralyses the members of the Mexican government 
could not be relieved by my efforts’, while his agents were finding it ‘impossible to complete 
their mission, lacking support from the Mexican authorities’.60 Maximilian’s government, he 
wrote, sought to ‘leave to us all the odious exceptional and rigorous measures.’ In fiscal 
matters, meanwhile, Mexican officials showed a ‘passive resistance’ to supervision.61 While 
tax revenues, particularly from customs, seem to have increased during the intervention, 
these remained far from adequate to cover the costs of the army.62 The ensuing ‘penury’ of 
the Mexican treasury inhibited the government from functioning effectively, and denuded 
Maximilian of resources that he might use for sake of developing his support among the 
Mexican population.63 Encouraged by Juárez’s agents, banditry remained rife, and French 
efforts to raise tax revenues by expediting Mexican economic development, for instance 
through railway construction, made slow progress. Were it to succeed, therefore, the 
process of state-formation would take longer than the French had anticipated – a prospect 
for which they had little enthusiasm.  
 With the continuing inadequacy of the Mexican tax system and the loans of 1864 
and 1865 having been largely spent, the Mexican government’s financial dependence on 
France increased. Despite the difficulties evinced since the beginning of the expedition, 
Fould maintained, with growing impatience, that Mexico was ‘rich and it must pay if it wants 
us to give it security.’64 In April 1866, wearying of the expense and faced with growing 
hostility to the expedition from the French public, mounting pressure from the United 
States following the end of the Civil War and the consequently resurgent Mexican 
republicans, the French government announced its intention to evacuate Mexico between 
November 1866 and November 1867, which had ‘an adverse influence on Mexican 
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resources in paralysing business and in estranging capital.’65 Mexican credit, already frail, 
collapsed (figure 1). In May, following persistent requests from Maximilian for advances, 
Bazaine conceded 500,000 piastres per month, to be secured against customs revenue.66 
The decision to withdraw, paradoxically, increased the cost of the expedition until the 
evacuation was actually realized. ‘The ever-growing embarrassments of the [Mexican] 
Treasury,’ wrote Bazaine, ‘are a cause of malaise that paralyses everything’.67 The French 
government, though, resolved to provide no further advances to Maximilian’s government, 
despite the commitment of the ‘men on the spot’ to the intervention and their claims that 
fiscal equilibrium could be attained in Mexico.68 Instead, a new agreement concluded in July 
gave the French half of all Mexican customs revenue.69 By this point, though, all Mexico’s 
debts, both those privately contracted and those owed to the French government, were 
secured against ‘the mirage of brilliant customs revenue’, as Fould sardonically put it. With 
no credit forthcoming from the non-existent Banco de México,70 at the end of 1865 
Maximilian had proposed to raise 500 million francs in London using customs as collateral. 
While Fould was more than happy for the Mexicans to raise money in London, he was wary 
of imposing another burden on customs revenue and doubted that investors would buy.71 
Financially, Maximilian’s Mexico offered no hope of return – though as late as March 1867, 
for example, one French provincial newspaper perhaps somewhat disingenuously described 
Mexican bonds as ‘always in high demand’ on the Paris bourse (figure 1).72   
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 The French hoped to leave Maximilian with the means to survive, but even before 
their evacuation the outlook was bleak. ‘Property produces nothing’, wrote Bazaine; ‘the 
civil, political, financial, military and judicial administrations do not function.’73 Unpaid, 
Mexican troops were deserting and defecting.74 The French government’s termination of 
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the subsidies granted by Bazaine was, one officer wrote, ‘a death sentence’ for Maximilian’s 
regime.75 The latter’s collapse, though, would imperil the repayment of the money the 
French had put into Mexico since 1861. For the French government, and certainly for Fould, 
preserving the investment of French nationals was a high priority, which became 
significantly more important as the loans of 1864 and 1865 drew more French capital into 
Mexico.76 The problem was all the more acute, given the probability that Maximilian’s 
regime would collapse following the French withdrawal. While Fould at least talked as 
though he expected a new government to honour Mexico’s debts to France, his colleagues 
harboured no such delusions.77 Thus, upon resuming power in 1867, the Republican 
government denied that it owed French creditors, exacerbating the problems of legitimacy 
that the Mexican expedition created for Napoleon III’s regime. 
 
 
II 
 
The Mexican expedition may have ended in 1867, but it remained a fixture in criticism of the 
Bonapartist regime until the latter’s collapse. The withdrawal coincided with an 
intensification of the difficulties confronting the Second Empire in the late 1860s. In part, 
these arose from the liberalization of the Empire that began in 1860. In 1864, the Le 
Chapelier law, which had prohibited workers’ unionization, was repealed in a forlorn bid to 
cultivate the urban working class.78 The ensuing wave of strikes intensified towards the end 
of the decade as the economy proved sluggish,79 following poor harvests, outbreaks of 
cholera and financial crises, all of which fuelled what the opposition called ‘la grève du 
milliard’. Referring to the ‘milliard’ in the vaults of the Banque de France which permitted 
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interest rates to fall, the opposition lambasted government policy as creating an 
atmosphere of uncertainty, unconducive to investment despite the surplus of capital and 
thus causing economic malaise.80 Meanwhile, restrictions on the press were relaxed, 
providing the regime’s critics with new fora in which to attack the government. The latter 
came under particularly heavy fire after the Prussian army’s unexpectedly rapid victory over 
Austria in 1866 presented a challenge to French primacy in Europe, precipitating a foreign 
policy crisis. Though Napoleon had made a pre-war bargain with Bismarck to ensure the 
transfer of Venetia to Italy, France itself made no tangible gain, which left the impression of 
acquiescence in Prussian aggrandisement for nothing in return. Seeking compensation, the 
government attempted to orchestrate the acquisition of Belgium and Luxembourg, but 
without success.81 These inept machinations to recoup prestige in Europe, wrote the duc de 
Persigny, a former minister and staunch Bonapartist, reinforced the impression that the 
government was ‘completely corrupt’; ‘today everybody believes the Empire is going to 
ruin’.82 Withdrawal from Mexico, in effect defeat, was a further blow. All these setbacks 
aggravated the problems confronting the French fiscal-military system.  
 Given continuing pressure for retrenchment, the weight of expenditure in Mexico, 
which showed no sign of yielding imminent success, became increasingly difficult to justify. 
In 1866, Fould noted the ‘strong reluctance of the [legislative] chamber with respect to the 
Mexican expedition’.83 Persuading deputies to vote money for Mexico was becoming 
harder. Already in 1862, the prefect of the Meurthe had noted the ‘unanimous approbation’ 
that greeted a reduction in the size of the army and thus of military spending, given the 
peace in Europe and the unpopularity of recent tax increases, particularly on salt.84 In 1864-
1865, before the withdrawal, Fould forced further cuts to the army budget. According to the 
prefect of the Aube, these were ‘received by public opinion in the most favourable manner’, 
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and there was a general desire for the cuts to have been greater.85 Under pressure to 
minimize expenditure in Mexico, Bazaine wrote that he had ‘ceaselessly made every effort 
to arrive at notable economies’.86 As Marshal Randon, the war minister, rather caustically 
recalled, ‘Everybody wanted reductions in the army, a lowering of the expenditure of the 
war ministry, at the same time as they were pretending that the Mexican expedition was 
ruining our arsenals and was exhausting our army.’87 The Mexican expedition may not have 
exhausted the army, but it certainly produced war-weariness. ‘France’s task is complete: the 
enemy we had to fight is defeated...’, wrote one observer in La Presse in 1866. ‘The task of 
Mexico is to be continued and achieved; but, we repeat, it is a Mexican interest that does 
not bind in any way the policy or action of France’.88 While military leaders such as Forey 
wished to remain in Mexico, adamant, as they had been for years, that final victory was 
imminent,89 they were in a clear minority by 1866. Procureurs généraux, charged with 
evaluating public opinion in the regions over which they exercised jurisdiction, emphasized 
the widespread satisfaction at the withdrawal from Mexico.90 
 The Mexican expedition was generally unpopular, but public opinion was 
multifaceted. The satisfaction at the end of the expedition, wrote the procureur in Dijon,  
is mixed with a feeling of humiliation. It is felt that our efforts in this faraway country 
have failed; it is supposed that American pressure, as much as the difficulties 
inherent in the enterprise, determined our retreat & national pride suffers from both 
of these thoughts. One calculates that the sacrifice in men & in money that we have 
uselessly made & all the investors in Mexican loans who, for the most part, belong to 
the class of small capitalists that the promise of high interest [rates] calls more than 
others towards hazardous placements, reproach the Government for having pushed 
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them towards this disastrous speculation. All these sentiments, inspired by the 
national or private interests, are sourly displayed.91 
The Mexican expedition, in other words, offered plenty of causes for grievance among the 
French public, particularly with respect to the fiscal-military system on which French great 
power depended. Discontent at the waste of blood and treasure was blamed on the 
government, weakening the legitimacy of the regime. Investors in Mexican bonds, generally 
described by procureurs as ‘middle class’, worried that their investments would be lost in 
the withdrawal. While few of these bondholders seem to have expressed a desire for the 
French to remain in Mexico, they nevertheless hoped that the government would save them 
from their predicament. The appeal to small capital, encouraged by the government in 
1864-1865, came at a political price. Moreover, rescuing French bondholders depended 
heavily on the Mexican government, since the idea that the French government would 
guarantee Mexican bonds was politically difficult. While some supported the idea, the 
procureur in Caen, for example, noted that much of the wider public saw it as ‘excessive and 
unjust’.92 Indeed, the concern for Mexican bondholders was not universal. As the procureur 
in the industrial town of Douai observed, ‘the working classes of the towns and the 
countryside remain completely indifferent’.93 
 The government’s problem was that the bondholders, though a minority, had 
prominent advocates in the press and the Corps législatif. ‘I am very worried about the 
question of the investors in the Mexican loan’, wrote Napoleon, because the regime’s 
opponents ‘want to exploit their discontent.’94 In July 1867, Pierre-Antoine Berryer, a 
legitimist deputy and frequent critic of the management of the public finances and of the 
Mexican expedition,95 denounced the government for having allowed the bankers to 
swindle small investors, lambasting in particular the director of the Comptoir d’escompte, 
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Alphonse Pinard, whose firm had played a leading role in issuing the Mexican loans.96 As 
one of the self-described ‘fools’ who invested in Mexican bonds wrote, Pinard and his 
associates ‘know so well how to profit from our ignorance’.97 The bankers responded by 
seeking to deflect criticism of themselves onto the regime. In November, Pinard chastised 
the government for having ‘proclaimed almost officially that the Mexican empire had 
exceptional resources and that French capitalists could entrust it with their money with 
complete confidence.’98 Turbulence on the bourse in 1867 probably reinforced the 
willingness to castigate bankers over the Mexican loans and, like the latter, was easily linked 
to the government, further eroding small investors’ confidence in the regime. In September 
1867, a crisis at the Crédit mobilier, a joint-stock finance company established in 1852 with 
the government’s support, reached its climax in a widely-reported scandal. Run by the 
Pereire brothers, the Crédit mobilier and its management maintained close links with the 
regime. Indeed, the government had attempted to rescue the Pereires, most notably by 
allowing the Crédit mobilier to double its share capital in 1866.99 ‘The misfortune of the 
Crédit mobilier coincides with failures abroad,’ wrote the republican Jules Ferry; ‘and while 
affairs in Mexico and Germany provide a big lesson in foreign policy, the losses, scattered 
across all classes by this great financial deception, complete the economic education of the 
French people.’100 In 1868, Ferry delivered another financial cause célèbre, this one less 
well-founded, by denouncing the mismanagement of the municipal Parisian finances.101 
Despite these blows to the regime’s reputation for economic competence, the financial 
turbulence had one positive outcome: it increased the attractiveness of government rentes 
as a safe haven, a sense reinforced by the difficulties of other foreign companies, 
particularly those associated with the Crédit mobilier.102 As a result of these failures abroad, 
which Hottinguer described as ‘a cause of ruin for everyone’, ‘small investors buy rentes and 
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French securities’.103 Thus, when in August 1868 the government opened a public 
subscription for loan of 429 million francs, issued partly to convert short-term securities 
used to finance the Mexican expedition, it received subscriptions worth 15,000 million 
francs from a total of 781,292 people.104 While the procureur in Besançon noted the 
‘immense enthusiasm’ for the loan, he also observed that ‘ceaselessly repeated rumours of 
war disturb and alarm people, who retain their capital and break off negotiations. Business 
hesitates and deals only in the short term’.105 The loan was one of the few good, long-term 
investments available. At the same time, the ‘rumours of war’ kept attention on the 
government’s foreign policy – with its less than glorious record.  
 The number of investors in the 1868 loan reflected a transformation of the French 
financial system during the Second Empire in line with the democratization of French 
politics during the period, which risked being undermined by the financial travails of the late 
1860s, not least those arising from Mexico. The investing public had grown substantially in 
the 1850s, which was demonstrated most dramatically in the issuing of 1,500 million francs 
of rentes by public subscription to finance the Crimean War, as the government had 
promoted ‘the universal suffrage of capital’, aspiring to create the property-owning 
democracy of the nineteenth century. The liberalization of the Empire in the 1860s was part 
of this project, intended as it was to broaden the regime’s appeal, in part to the ‘middle 
class’ – precisely those people whose savings vanished in Mexican bonds. These investors, 
noted the prefect of the Loiret, had ‘confidence in the wisdom of the Emperor’s 
Government and count on the support of the deputies of the Loiret to defend their interests 
in the event that they could be threatened.’106 The failure to protect investors in Mexican 
bonds probably stimulated dissatisfaction with the regime among the ‘middle class’, forcing 
the continued liberalization of the Empire, both to restore the government’s standing 
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among such people where possible and to cultivate greater support among the lower 
classes. The latter, more indifferent to the issue of Mexican bonds, could buttress the 
regime in the face of middle-class discontent. To an extent, therefore, the politics of the 
‘Liberal Empire’ mirrored those of Disraeli’s One-Nation Conservatism in Britain: appealing 
to the lower classes to facilitate democratization on conservative terms. In Britain, this 
appeal relied on social and electoral reforms, while in France it depended on public works 
and social reforms such as the permission to unionize and, in both countries, it entailed 
invocations of jingoistic nationalism, even if the Bonapartist appeal to nationalism was 
complicated by the regime’s foreign policy failures. 
 The furore over the Mexican bonds coincided with a debate over military reform. 
Indeed, historians have overlooked the Mexican expedition’s consequences for army reform 
in 1867, focusing instead on the impact of Prussia’s victory over Austria. Certainly, though 
Napoleon had favoured military reform in the aftermath of the Wars of Italian Unification of 
1859-1860, the outcome of the Austro-Prussian war created a renewed urgency. Since 1818, 
the French army had relied on long-term conscription – seven years’ service in 1866 – for 
which men were chosen by lot, in contrast to the Prussian system of shorter, more universal 
service after which soldiers passed into the reserve. In 1866, seeking the benefits of a larger 
reserve, Napoleon backed proposals for shorter, universal military service. The opposition 
was widespread. Randon, favouring an army of professional soldiers, resigned; Niel, his 
successor, was better disposed towards Napoleon’s ideas, though he too had reservations. 
Thus, before a reform bill was even drafted, Napoleon was pushed to dilute his initial 
design. In December, the government proposed that men would spend six years each in the 
army and the reserve, after which they would become part of a new garde mobile. In 
unveiling the proposal, the government showed its sensitivity to discontent with the fiscal-
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military system, promising that reform would not ‘encumber the finances of the state, nor 
impose too heavy a burden on the population’; the state did not want ‘to divert in 
peacetime the vocations of young men aspiring to the liberal professions.’107 Despite such 
reassurances, officials noted the resounding unpopularity of the proposal, which was so 
badly castigated in the Corps législatif that the government was forced to further dilute it 
before it eventually passed in January 1868.108 
 The disaster in Mexico goes some way towards explaining the opposition to the 
government’s proposal. True, most arguments against the bill did not revolve around 
Mexico. Liberals criticized an expansion of the army as facilitating a more oppressive state, 
conservatives feared the consequences of arming the masses, while republicans supported 
more universal conscription than the government proposed. The possible consequences of 
drawing labour away from agriculture and industry were a further concern, particularly 
given the regime’s receding reputation for economic competence.109 However, the army law 
debate also offered a means of airing more general grievances against the regime, not least 
because the issue of conscription affected both domestic and foreign policy. Thus, days 
before the law passed, a candidate for a by-election decried the ‘system of official 
candidates’ – that is deputies nominated for election by the government – which had 
‘directed us into Mexico; it is the same system that, tomorrow, in full peacetime, will give us 
a military law the application of which agricultural and industrial France cannot long 
sustain’.110 As the criticism of official candidatures indicates, the Mexican expedition was 
invoked during the army law debate to support further liberalization of the Empire. Already 
in 1866 as the debacle in Mexico became apparent, opposition politicians such as Adolphe 
Thiers, a former minister and among the most distinguished of the opposition deputies in 
the Corps législatif, had used the opportunity to demand a more consultative political 
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process. The existing political system, Thiers and others argued, had allowed the expedition 
despite the French public’s indifference. As a result, France, committed in Mexico, had 
lacked the means for action in Europe in 1866.111 While the regime made some minor 
concessions to such pressures, allowing the Corps législatif to question ministers from 
January 1867, agitation for liberalization remained unabated and was exacerbated by the 
debate over the army law.112 In sapping the regime’s prestige, the failures in Mexico and in 
Europe in 1866-1867 did nothing to endow the government with the kind of political capital 
necessary to impose greater sacrifices on the French population for the sake of foreign 
policy.  
 The pressure for political liberalization compounded the war-weariness arising from 
the Mexican expedition, none of which made larger-scale conscription, generally unpopular 
at the best of times, more palatable. The expedition had made lightening the fiscal-military 
burden more difficult earlier in the decade, when France faced little geopolitical threat, and 
made raising the burden correspondingly harder later in the decade, when such a threat 
materialized. Indeed, some ministers feared the electoral consequences of extending 
conscription.113 While the Mexican expedition and other military actions abroad fed an 
existing republican pacifism,114 anti-war sentiment pervaded large sections of society. The 
procureur in Chambéry, for example, noted in 1868 that given the ‘angry memories’ left by 
the military interventions in Italy and Mexico, a war at the emperor’s behest, without 
popular support, would endanger the dynasty; thus, the liberalization of the Empire was 
essential.115 Not only could liberalization reduce the regime’s aggressiveness abroad, but 
the Mexican legacy emphasized the potentially unwelcome geopolitical implications of the 
army law. Thus, the liberal deputy Maurice Richard argued that extending conscription 
risked encouraging the aggressive foreign policy evinced in Mexico.116 Similarly, the 
 24 
republican Jules Favre claimed that the Mexican expedition had aroused other powers’ fears 
of French aggression, which an expansion of the army would only reinforce; consequently, 
the law would diminish France’s influence abroad.117 Such invocations of the Mexican 
debacle during the debates on the army law exacerbated the problems of legitimacy facing 
the regime and the fiscal-military system. 
 The legitimacy crisis and the legacy of the Mexican expedition were clearly reflected 
in the legislative elections of May 1869. Indeed, during the final months of the Empire, 
suggests Roger Price, ‘a substantial amount of support for violent revolution was building 
up’, though, as he observes, revolutionary socialism had very limited appeal outside major 
industrial centres.118 Still, the 1869 elections showed notable gains for opposition liberals 
and republicans, the latter receiving a substantial increase in working class support despite 
the regime’s charm offensive, while the government retained a clear majority of seats.119 In 
some rural areas such as the Morvan nivernais, the republicans were the chief beneficiaries 
of increased voter turnout, though the official candidate was still elected.120 The army law 
provided a principal theme of the campaign,121 with election literature reiterating the 
malaise of the fiscal-military system and invoking the Mexican expedition. The regime, Favre 
charged, ‘has spent our millions, it has sacrificed our children to enterprises which the 
country would have stopped had it been consulted freely.’ Mexico, as the most recent, one 
of the longest-lasting and most expensive albeit not the costliest in French lives, was 
foremost among these ‘enterprises’. Though French troops remained in Rome until 1870, 
the Italian wars ended in 1860, as did the intervention in China, while the expedition to 
Syria ended the following year; and whereas the French had a more protracted presence in 
Cochinchina, establishing a colony there in 1863, this required only a small fraction of the 
men and money lost in Mexico. Though Cochinchina consumed 60 million francs in 1860, an 
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expense partly inflated by the intervention in China, costs there fell from 57 million in 1862 
to 22 million in 1863, stabilizing at around 19-20 million annually thereafter. Even with a 
revenue of 1,630,000 francs from Cochinchina in 1863, its deficit was markedly smaller than 
Mexico’s, which that year peaked at 97,619,000 francs (table 1).122 The regime, Favre 
continued, ‘has maintained, aggravated a system of compression which weighs on all minds. 
It has doubled the debt, increased its burdens, it has asked the Corps législatif for and 
obtained upon proclaiming it necessary an army of eight hundred thousand which removes 
for nine years our children from work, family and marriage’.123 Other candidates referenced 
Mexico more explicitly. Denouncing the growth of public expenditure, one wrote that ‘other 
powers have grown in Europe, while in Mexico a useless and unfortunate expedition cost 
precious blood of our valiant armies’.124 With the passage of the army law, another told 
voters, ‘all your sons are soldiers’, which exacerbated the risks of the adventurous policy 
apparent in the ‘faraway expedition’ of Mexico.125 ‘You were told one day: the Empire 
means peace’, wrote the republican Taxile Delord, citing Napoleon’s famous speech of 1852, 
‘and the Empire has been until now one long war. In the Crimea, in Italy, in China, in Mexico 
the blood of our children has been spilled.’126  
 Meanwhile, the problem of the bondholders remained. Seeking to douse continuing 
public anger, in 1868 the government had offered a partial refund of Mexican bonds in the 
1869 budget proposing to raise 68 million francs by issuing 3 million francs of rentes.127 The 
government’s proposal did little to satisfy the bondholders; Germiny did ‘not hesitate’ to 
denounce it as ‘incomplete, insufficient.’128 Many bondholders sent letters and petitions to 
the Corps législatif, while the holders of over 6,000 bonds formed a committee to lobby the 
deputies.129 Ministers consequently agreed to increase the compensation to 4 million francs 
of rentes, then worth just over 93 million francs, which were to be used alongside 
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5,675,068.20 francs deposited at the Caisse des dépôts et consignations. The latter, charged 
with managing a wide range of private assets for the French state, had taken custody of 
some of the money raised from the Mexican loans. Nevertheless, the holders of some 
40,000 Mexican bonds still declined the refund, preferring not to compromise their claim on 
the Mexican government.130 As the number of refusals suggests, many investors remained 
dissatisfied. Thus, during the election campaign, one journalist, for example, condemned 
the Corps législatif for having approved men and money for the expedition and for having 
acquiesced in the government’s swindle of small investors in Mexican bonds.131 The legacy 
of the Mexican expedition therefore provided ready fodder for the campaign against the 
government, with the fiscal-military system facing particularly intense criticism. 
 Despite the discontent, a plebiscite in May 1870 endorsed a new, more liberal 
constitution for the Empire, suggesting at least an acceptance of the regime. However, the 
dissatisfaction prompted by the Mexican expedition and expressed in the elections of 1869 
had certainly not vanished. Noting the general desire for peace, the procureur in Riom wrote 
in April 1870 that a ‘war would stop the reforms that we [the people] cannot wait to see’, 
which included ‘tax cuts [and] economies’ in public spending.132 Indeed, Bonapartism 
retained firm support in parts of rural France, benefitting from an association with lower 
taxation, while Republicanism remained tainted by the memory of tax increases imposed by 
the Second Republic in 1848.133 Despite the Prussian threat, and Napoleon’s reluctance, the 
army budget therefore faced further reductions in 1870.134 Meanwhile, the unpopularity of 
military expenditure and the conscription it implied was an important factor in pushing the 
French to propose, unsuccessfully, Franco-Prussian disarmament in early 1870.135 As with 
the debate over army reform, the regime’s precariousness inhibited the preparations that 
might have better enabled France to counter the Prussian threat. 
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 The remarkably rapid collapse of the regime partly reflected its continuing problems 
of legitimacy. With war against Prussia, wrote the finance minister shortly after the 
outbreak of hostilities in July 1870, ‘we risk the dynasty and at the same time the destinies 
of our country’.136 Like Napoleon III’s other wars, that of 1870 aroused limited popular 
enthusiasm.137 While the outbreak of hostilities produced a patriotic élan, this quickly 
became antipathy following the defeats of early August, which effectively destroyed 
Napoleon’s authority – in contrast to 1914 when the Germans reached the Marne without 
imperilling the Republic’s legitimacy. The emperor, defeatist before the war began, 
remarked that ‘all [was] lost’. Returning hurriedly to Paris from Saint-Cloud, the Empress 
Eugénie pronounced the dynasty as finished.138 Though she too was generally rather 
fatalistic, having in August 1866 described the state of affairs after the Prussian victory in 
the Austro-Prussian War as ‘the beginning of the end of the dynasty’,139 other well-informed 
observers agreed: ‘even with a victory we [the French people] have accounts that are too 
big to settle’, wrote Alphonse de Rothschild; the dynasty was doomed as ‘irritation against 
the present government is pushed to its final limits’.140 In Paris and elsewhere, 
demonstrations against the regime multiplied, encouraged by rumours of treason.141 A 
former opposition deputy, and thus albeit a rather jaundiced observer, travelling between 
Tulle and Brides-les-Bains in mid-August noted the widespread unpopularity of the 
government, ‘a ministry of treason’ that was neglecting the defence of France and 
represented ‘the last expression of personal power’.142 The Empire was defunct before 
Sedan. Public hostility, arising from socio-economic difficulties and political missteps such as 
the Mexican expedition, left the regime with limited stamina by 1870. Given this fragility, 
withdrawal towards Paris, which would have made sense militarily by mid-August, became 
politically impossible. Instead, needing a victory, Napoleon and the army were pushed into a 
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disastrous march to Sedan, where he surrendered on 2 September. The paralysis of the 
army command that allowed strategy to be almost totally dictated by domestic politics also 
reflected more directly the toxic legacy of Mexico. In his attempt to deflect responsibility for 
the Mexican debacle, Napoleon had used the press to insinuate that Bazaine had 
mishandled the expedition. The consequently tense relations between Napoleon and one of 
his most distinguished commanders, already problematic at the start of the war, became 
more so when he was forced to give Bazaine command of the main French army after the 
reversals of early August.143 While the French command structure during the war was in any 
case inadequate, here, as in other respects, the outcome of the Mexican expedition 
contributed to the defeat at Sedan and thus to the eclipse of French primacy in Europe. 
 
 
III 
 
The Mexican expedition contributed significantly to the erosion of the Bonapartist regime in 
the late 1860s. The cost of the intervention, though sustainable, inhibited Fould’s hopes of 
streamlining the state to strengthen the regime and perpetuated an image of the 
government as wasteful of public funds. The maintenance of high taxes and the limits to 
reductions in military spending in the early 1860s weakened the Empire’s legitimacy, 
sapping political capital which might have used more effectively in resisting the rise of 
Prussia. The protracted intervention in Mexico enhanced the regime’s alleged partiality to 
armed conflict, which was unpopular among the French public and did nothing to 
strengthen the case for more extensive conscription in 1867. Moreover, in the seeking to 
alleviate the burden of Mexico on the French treasury, the government created a further 
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problem of dissatisfied bondholders after 1867. Like the regime’s reputation for war, the 
issue of the bondholders presented a challenge to its legitimacy. 
 The crisis of executive power that the Mexican expedition helped to provoke lasted 
until the late 1870s. In this respect, 1870-1871 was less of a caesura in French history than 
historians have suggested. By the time the crisis ended in the late 1870s, monarchy was 
rapidly losing credibility in French politics, and with it went support for a strong one-man 
executive. While Thiers, president of the Republic from 1871 until his removal by the 
National Assembly in 1873, exercised considerable executive power, the presidency 
diminished thereafter. In 1877, his successor, the royalist MacMahon replaced his 
republican président du conseil Simon, precipitating a constitutional crisis as the republican 
majority in the Assembly immediately passed a motion of no confidence in the new 
government. In the ensuing elections, the republicans retained their majority, effectively 
marking the triumph of the legislature over the executive. The weakening of the executive, 
though, reflected the legacy of the Liberal Empire; indeed, as historians such as Philip Nord 
and Sudhir Hazareesingh have shown, the political culture of the Third Republic owed much 
to the Second Empire.144 In the 1860s, as we have seen, the opposition lamented the lack of 
oversight of the executive, citing a long catalogue of the government’s failures – not least 
that in Mexico. With the Third Republic, the plebiscite, touted by Ollivier as the distinction 
between the Liberal Empire and a parliamentary regime,145 was shelved, as was direct 
election to the presidency. Instead, the president of the Republic was chosen by the 
National Assembly, curbing the executive’s capacity to claim to legitimacy independent of 
the legislature.  
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If the end of the Second Empire did not resolve the crisis of the executive, Sedan came 
closer to settling the problem of the fiscal-military system. The army was overhauled in the 
aftermath of defeat, and universal conscription was introduced. Meanwhile, despite the 
opposition rhetoric of streamlining the state in the 1860s, the Third Republic presided over 
the accelerated growth of government expenditure, not least through public works, as the 
state continued to expand.146 The opposition critique of executive power in the 1860s 
entailed lambasting the government for disposing of the nation’s blood and treasure 
without sufficient accountability to the people. Indeed, Fould, who opposed political 
liberalization in the 1860s, saw reductions in government expenditure as a means of 
reinforcing the more authoritarian Empire established in the 1850s by mitigating discontent 
with the fiscal system. Instead, the growth of public expenditure encouraged the 
liberalization of the Empire and, ultimately, the creation of a parliamentary regime. In this 
respect, the Mexican expedition, in impeding Fould’s programme of retrenchment in the 
1860s, played a role in forcing the liberalization of the regime – all the more so, since the 
‘Liberal Empire’ of 1870 was largely a consequence of the legitimacy crisis that the failure in 
Mexico helped to create. Thus, the Mexican expedition not only reduced the Second 
Empire’s capacity to respond to the rise of Prussia; it also expedited the creation of a 
parliamentary democracy in France.  
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